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INTRODUCTION
Despite India’s status as a sovereign nation, permanent remnants
of its former colonial rule are still visible throughout the country.1
Victorian architecture dots the city landscape and railroads built when
India was under British rule snake their way through the countryside.2
More importantly, however, is what is invisible to the naked eye.3 The
common law system put in place by the British during their two1. Taru Dalmia & David M. Malone, Historical Influences on India’s Foreign Policy, 67
INT’L J. 1029, 1040 (2012) (commenting on the Indian parliamentary system and judiciary put
in place by the British); see also Stephen McClarence, India: All the Raj, THE TELEGRAPH
(Oct.
24,
2008),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/3247067/India-All-the-Raj.html
(highlighting some buildings built by the British and used as hotels and other tourist attractions
today).
2. See McClarence, supra note 1.
3. Atul M. Setalvad & H. Jayesh, India, in SET-OFF LAW AND PRACTICE 233, 233
(William Johnston & Thomas Werlen eds., 2010) (stating that any situation covered by a
statute is governed by English common law); see also S. Gupta & M. A. Batki, India, in
INTERNATIONAL BANK INSOLVENCIES: A CENTRAL BANK PERSPECTIVE 95, 95 (Mario
Giovanoli & Gregor Heirich eds., 1999) (asserting the use of common law principles by the
Indian Judiciary).
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hundred year rule of the sub-continent still affects both individuals
and businesses in their daily routines.4
Post-independence, Indian foreign policy was largely based on
the practice of import substitution: the Indian economy closed its
doors to international investment.5 Indian laws—including insolvency
laws—followed British antecedents.6 Finally, in 1956, the Indian
Legislature enacted its own corporate statute, the Indian Companies
Act.7 The purpose of this act was to consolidate legislation regarding
corporations.8 It provided for the winding-up of insolvent companies.9
However, Indian jurisprudence was still in its nascent stages and
relied heavily on the English principles of justice, equity, and good
conscience to resolve matters that were not covered by statutory
law.10
It was not until the 1990s that the government liberalized the
Indian economy, leading to an inflow of foreign direct investment
(“FDI”).11 Multinational companies began looking at India as a viable
market for their goods and international investors began lending to
Indian corporations.12 The economic prosperity was ubiquitous and
4. Setalvad & Jayesh, supra note 3; see also Gupta & Batki, supra note 3.
5. Arvind Panagariya, India’s Trade Reform: Progress, Impact and Future Strategy,
COLUM. INDIA F., 1, 18 (Mar. 4, 2004), http://www.columbia.edu/~ap2231/Policy%20Papers/
IPF_India.pdf (asserting that the policy of import substitution negatively affected trade); see
also Sophia N. Johnson, Emerging Norms in Economic Governance: An Examination of
Authority Structures & The Growing Importance of New Forms of Governance in Liberalized
India 31 (May 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University) (commenting on the
transition from the import substitution policy to an export oriented policy).
6. See Gupta & Batki, supra note 3, at 96.
7. See generally Companies Act, No. 1 of 1956, INDIA CODE (2002), pmbl. (stating that
the Act received the assent of the President of India on January 18, 1956).
8. See id. (declaring that the Act consolidates and amends the laws relating to companies
in India).
9. Companies Act, No. 1 of 1956, INDIA CODE (2002), § 433 (using the term “windingup” as a step in the liquidation process of a company where the court appoints a receiver
(trustee) to settle outstanding accounts and liquidate assets of the company).
10. See Setalvad & Jayesh, supra note 3.
11. Johnson, supra note 5, at ii (stating that India implemented an economic
liberalization policy starting in 1991); see also Peter Lamb, The Indian Electricity Market:
Country Study and Investment Context 2 (Stan. U. Program on Energy & Sustainable Dev.,
Working Paper No. 48, 2005) (recognizing an improvement in the Indian Economy due to
FDI).
12. Paresh Somalkar, Impact of Globalization on the Indian Economy, ABHINAV NAT’L
J. OF RES. IN ARTS & EDUC. 5, 8 (Aug. 2012) (discussing the entrance of multinational
corporations and FDI in India); see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 16 (highlighting the
importance of non-state actors such as multinational corporations in the economic
development of India).
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prompted calls for reform to the legal framework.13 One of the areas
still in need of change was corporate insolvency.14
This Note analyzes the existing law, shortcomings, and their
resolutions within the realm of cross-border insolvency in India. Not
only are such matters relatively new, but also their scope is not well
defined. Indian jurisprudence, being an offshoot of the British
common law system, often turns to British law when a court is faced
with cases with which it is unfamiliar, such as matters of cross-border
insolvency.15 The judges use innovative techniques and incorporate
English common law when adjudicating winding-up petitions of
overseas components.16 But this innovation is neither uniform nor
predictable due to the overlap in domestic laws.17 In the absence of
positive enactment of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL’s”) Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency (“Model Law”) or any other statute consolidating
the Indian insolvency regime, the current judicial approach of dealing
with cross-border insolvencies in India is disorderly, chaotic, and
leads to forum shopping.18 This Note highlights judicial activism and
the judges’ creativity of merging the separate provisions of law while
dealing with cross-border insolvencies. The result of this process is
less predictable than it would be had the Model Law been enacted.
This Note is divided into three sections: applicable laws, issues,
and resolution. Part I provides the legal framework for resolving
13. See Charan Wadhwa, India Trying to Liberalize: Economic Reforms Since 1991, in
THE ASIA PACIFIC: A REGION IN TRANSITION 259, 280 (Jim Rolfe ed., 2004) (maintaining that
efficient and speedy implementation of economic reforms depended on legal reforms); see also
Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Economic Reforms in India since 1991: Has Gradualism Worked?,
J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 67, 82 (Summer 2012) (asserting that efficiency of banks is limited
by the legal framework which needs to be reformed.)
14. See infra Part I (discussing the laws applicable to cross-border insolvency situation
and their shortcomings).
15. See Setalvad & Jayesh, supra note 3.
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. Mithilesh Kumar, Cross Border Insolvency: Indian Law Vis A Vis International Law:
UNCITRAL Model, MONDAQ: INDIAN LEGAL IMPETUS (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/257314/international+trade+investment/Cross+Border+Insol
vency+Indian+Law+Vis+A+Vis+International+Law+UNCITRAL+Model (expressing that
Indian common law is inadequate when enforcing foreign judgments, and rights and relief to
creditors); see also Nimrit Kang & Nitin Nayar, The Evolution of Corporate Bankruptcy Law
in India, ICRA BULL.: MONEY AND FIN. 37, 38 (Oct. 2003) (commenting on the lag in the
current legal system in providing the appropriate forum or policy framework for efficient and
equitable resolution of insolvency cases).
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cross-border insolvency disputes and includes references to statutes
and case law, including project finance restructuring. Part II examines
issues arising out of the legal framework. Finally, Part III provides
solutions for the issues.
I. LAWS APPLICABLE TO CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY CASES
The insolvency laws in present-day India are a result of judicial
impetus of its former British colonizers.19 Insolvency laws governing
individuals are the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1920 and the
Presidency Towns Insolvency Act of 1909.20 These statutes, put in
place in the early twentieth century, still occupy the domain for
dealing with individual insolvencies.21 Although they are similar to
British proceedings, some critics believe them to be archaic and in
desperate need of modernization.22 These statutes have a narrow local
focus and do not address emerging issues in cross-border insolvency
involving corporations and other business forms.23
The narrow local focus of the statutes places an excessive burden
on courts. Thus, the government established specialized tribunals such
as the Debt Recovery Tribunals under the Recovery of Debts Due to
Banks and Financial Institutions Act of 1993.24 This statute, however,
was narrow in its reach as it applied to only banks and financial
institutions as opposed to individuals and corporations.25 Another
drawback of this statute was that applications could only be made by
19. See Setalvad & Jayesh, supra note 3; see also Kang & Nayar, supra note 18, at 39
(claiming that the Indian Companies Act was modeled after the British Companies Act).
20. Gupta & Batki, supra note 3, at 95 (emphasizing that the Provincial Insolvency Act
of 1920 and Presidency Town Insolvency Act applied to individual insolvencies); see also
Setalvad & Jayesh, supra note 3, at 237 (recognizing that the above statutes apply to individual
insolvencies).
21. See Gupta & Batki, supra note 3, at 95; see also Setalvad & Jayesh, supra note 3, at
237.
22. Kumar, supra note 18, at 24 (acknowledging that the statutes are outdated); see also
Adam Feibelman, Consumer Finance & Insolvency Law in India: A Case Study, 36 BROOK
INT. L. J. 75, 107 (2010) (explaining that India’s consumer insolvency regime has not been
meaningfully altered since it was adopted at the beginning of the last century).
23. Feibelman, supra note 22, at 112 (referring to evidence that the Indian consumer
bankruptcy laws are dysfunctional in the contemporary context and fail to provide benefits to
consumers or to the broader society); see also Kumar, supra note 18, at 24.
24. Feibelman, supra note 22, at 92 (stating the efforts of the Indian Parliament enacting
the legislation creating Debt Recovery Tribunals); see also Kang & Nayar, supra note 18, at
41 (conceding that banks and financial institutions may approach the Debt Recovery Tribunals
to recover outstanding debts).
25. Feibelman, supra note 22, at 92; see Kang & Nayar, supra note 18, at 41.
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creditors and not by securitization special purpose vehicles, designed
to save the corporation through additional investments, thus resulting
in traditional but time-consuming methods of foreclosure being
applied to these entities.26
In 2002, the legislature codified for the first time regulations for
the securitization industry under the Securitization and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act of 2002 (“SARFAESI”).27 Under SARFAESI, a secured
creditor could enforce security over both movable and immovable
property without court intervention.28 Again, the scope of this Act
was limited, as secured creditors were narrowly defined to include
banks and financial institutions.29
Neither of the new insolvency laws delves into the realm of
cross-border insolvency.30 Nor do they discuss the ramifications of
the issues relating to cross-border insolvency as contemplated by the
Model Law such as Centre of Main Interests of the debtor.31
Therefore, the new laws do not address issues that arise in cases
concerning cross-border insolvency.
A. Overview of the Model Law
The Model Law is based on respecting the differences of the
legal systems of Member States and a non-insistence on substantive

26. Tessa Hoser & Ruth Wang, The Future of Indian Bank Securitization, 25 INT. FIN. L.
REV. 48, 48 (2006) (asserting that securitization special purpose vehicles could not make
recovery applications to the Debt Recovery Tribunals); see also Feibelman, supra note 22, at
92 (stating that only domestic banks and non-bank financial institutions can make applications
under the Act).
27. Hoser & Wang, supra note 26, at 48 (recognizing the creation of the SARFAESI to
allow creditors to enforce securities without court intervention); see also Padmanabhan Iyer,
India: The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 – An Overview of the Provisions, MONDAQ (Jul. 23, 2003),
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/22031/securitization+structured+finance/The+Securitisation+
and+Reconstruction+of+Financial+Assets+and+Enforcement+of+Security+Interest+Act
+2002+An+Overview+of+the+Provisions (acknowledging that the SARFAESI was enacted to
fill the gaps created by the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act).
28. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
29. Hoser & Wang, supra note 26, at 48 (identifying only banks and financial institutions
as secured creditors under the Act); see also Iyer, supra note 27 (stating that only banks and
financial institutions can securitize their financial assets).
30. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.

2016]

INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY

1051

unification of insolvency law.32 It is a response to the need for
uniformity and certainty in the outcomes of cross-border insolvency
proceedings.33 It can provide the courts with discretion enabling them
to arrive at pragmatic solutions to issues regarding cross-border
insolvency.34
The main objectives of the Model Law are mentioned in its
Preamble.35 The first objective is to promote cooperation between the
courts and other authorities of countries involved in cross-border
insolvency proceedings.36 Additionally, the Model Law provides
“greater legal certainty for trade and investment.”37 Further, it
administers a “fair and efficient system” that “protects the interests of
all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor” in

32. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY COOPERATION 10 (2005), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/
Practice_Guide_english.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE] (noting that
the UN General Assembly respected differences in the procedural and judicial systems of
States and that the differences would only contribute to the development of international
trade); see also The UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-à-vis Indian Insolvency Regime,
3, http://indiancaselaws.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/the-uncitral-model-insolvency-law-visc3a0-vis-indian-insolvency-regime.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-àvis India] (asserting that Model Law is based is respect to the differences among national laws
and non-insistence on substantive unification of insolvency law).
33. UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 14 (affirming that the
Model Law focuses on facilitating the administration of cross-border insolvency cases and
providing an interface between jurisdictions); see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law
vis-à-vis India, supra note 32 (recognizing that the Model Law addresses the need for certainty
in determining cross-border insolvency proceedings).
34. UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 14 (declaring that the
Model Law allows the courts to determine what relief is warranted for optimal disposition of
the insolvency proceedings); see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-à-vis India,
supra note 32, at 3 (identifying the broad discretion vested in the courts enabling them to
derive practical solutions to cross-border insolvency issues).
35. UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 12 (highlighting that the
preamble states the main focus of the Model Law); see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency
Law vis-à-vis India, supra note 32, at 3 (discussing the key objectives of the Model Law as are
mentioned in the Preamble).
36. UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 12 (citing cooperation as
the first objective of the preamble); see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-à-vis
India, supra note 32, at 3 (recognizing cooperation between courts as the first objective).
37. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A
JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE 6 (2013), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/V118812
9-Judicial_Perspective_ebook-E.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE]
(affirming that the Model Law is designed to meet the needs of “greater legal certainty for
trade and investment”); see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-à-vis India, supra
note 32, at 3 (asserting that the need for “greater legal certainty for trade and investment” is an
objective of the Model Law provided in its Preamble).
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cross-border insolvency proceedings.38 The Model Law also seeks to
“protect and maximize the value of the debtor’s assets.”39 Finally, it
aims to “facilitate the rescue, restructure, and reorganization of
financially troubled businesses,” thereby protecting investment and
preserving employment.40
The Model Law provides four main principles for the
achievement of the above-mentioned objectives.41 Firstly, the
“access” principle allows foreign representatives to initiate insolvency
proceedings in a different State (receiving court).42 Secondly, the
“recognition” principle provides the receiving court with the authority
to make an order recognizing the foreign proceeding, either as a
foreign “main” or “non-main” proceeding.43 Thirdly, the “relief”
principle grants “interim,” “automatic,” and “discretionary” relief.44
Automatic relief is the result when a proceeding is recognized as a
38. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 6 (discussing the need for
fair and efficient management of international insolvency proceedings, in the interests of all
creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor); see also UNCITRAL Model
Insolvency Law vis-à-vis India, supra note 32, at 4 (referring to the UNCITRAL JUDICIAL
PERSPECTIVE).
39. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 6 (asserting that the Model
Law implements measures for the protection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s
assets for distribution to creditors, whether by reorganization or liquidation); see also
UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-à-vis India, supra note 32, at 4 (citing the
UNCITRAL JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE).
40. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 6 (stating that the Model
Law facilitates the rescue of financially troubled businesses, with the aim of protecting
investment and preserving employment); see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-àvis India, supra note 32, at 4 (quoting the UNCITRAL JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE).
41. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 5 (affirming that there are
four principles on which the Model Law is built); see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law
vis-à-vis India, supra note 32, at 4 (discussing that the Model Law relies on four key
principles).
42. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 14 (recognizing that the
“access” principle allows the foreign representative to initiate proceedings in different States);
see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-à-vis India, supra note 32, at 4 (referring to
art. 2(d) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency).
43. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and
Interpretation art. 15, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-LawInsol-2013-Guide-Enactment-e.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law] (defining the
recognition principle); see also UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 14
(differentiating main or primary proceedings as those that originate where the debtor has its
centre of main interests from non-main or secondary proceedings which deal with the
liquidation of debtor’s assets elsewhere).
44. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 5 (distinguishing three
distinct situations which require courts to grant different kinds of relief); see also UNCITRAL
Model Insolvency Law vis-à-vis India, supra note 32, at 4 (asserting that the relief principle
seeks to provide possible avenues for granting relief).
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“main” proceeding.45 Automatic relief is usually a stay or suspension
of proceedings against the debtor.46 Interim relief may be granted
where an application for recognition is pending, for the protection of
assets within the jurisdiction of the receiving court.47 Discretionary
relief may be awarded if the judge feels the situation demands it, and
is available in both “main” and “non-main” proceedings.48 Finally, the
“cooperation” and “coordination” principle requires both courts and
insolvency representatives (similar to the trustees in US liquidation
proceedings), in different States to cooperate to the maximum extent
possible.49 This can help lead to a more fair and efficient
administration of the debtor’s estate.50 Moreover, it ensures that the
creditors have the maximum benefits.51 Several countries (such as the
United States and the United Kingdom) have, since its inception,
adopted the Model Law and enjoy the foregoing benefits.52

45. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 5 (defining automatic
relief); see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-à-vis India, supra note 32, at 4
(asserting that automatic relief follows main proceedings and referring to art. 21 of the Model
Law).
46. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 5; UNCITRAL Model
Insolvency Law vis-à-vis India, supra note 32, at 4.
47. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 5 (explaining interim
relief, including when it may be granted); see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-àvis India, supra note 32, at 4 (stating that interim relief may be granted where an application
for recognition is pending).
48. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 5-6 (characterizing
discretionary relief as relief granted when a court determines the case calls for it); see also
UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-à-vis India, supra note 32, at 4 (asserting that
discretionary relief may be granted in “main” and “non-main” proceedings).
49. UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 6 (defining the scope of
the coordination principle); see also UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law vis-à-vis India, supra
note 32, at 5 (explaining the meaning of the coordination principle).
50. UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 13 (stating that lack of
cooperation and coordination would impede fair and efficient administration of the debtor’s
estate) see also UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 6 (referring to the
UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE).
51. UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 13 (affirming that the
Model Law would be the most advantageous for creditors); see also UNCITRAL, A JUDICIAL
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 6 (discussing that the Model Law operates to maximize the
returns to the creditor).
52. UNCITRAL, Status UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html [Status
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency] (providing a list of countries that have
adopted the Model Law).
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B. Statutes Governing Cross-Border Insolvency in India
Like the United States, India is a federal country.53 The Indian
Constitution lists separate categories of issues over which the states
and the Central Government may legislate.54 However, a unique
aspect of the Indian Constitution is that it allows both states and the
Central Government to enact laws on specific subjects enlisted
therein.55 Particularly, bankruptcy and insolvency are specified areas
where both levels of governments may formulate law.56 In addition,
through various provisions, the Indian common law regime enables
the Indian courts to recognize the rights and claims of international
creditors and enforce the judgments passed by the courts of foreign
jurisdictions.57 These provisions are further explained below.
1. Foreign Judgments Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Indian laws recognize the principle of comity.58 This principle is
embodied in Section 44A of The Code of Civil Procedure of 1908
(“CPC”).59 Section 44A allows Indian courts to enforce orders passed
by non-Indian courts in “Reciprocating Territories.”60 A country
would be considered a reciprocating territory if it were declared one
by the Government of India through publication in the Official
Gazette.61 However, Section 44A is limited by Section 13 of the

53. Baogang He, The Federal Solution to Ethnic Conflicts, 7 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 29, 30
(2006) (affirming that India is a federal jurisdiction); see also Malcolm MacLaren, “Thank
You India.” Reflections on the 4th International Conference on Federalism, New Delhi, 5-7
November 2007, 9 GER. L.J. 367, 368 (2008) (stating that India is the world’s largest
federation).
54. INDIA CONST. art. 246, Lists I & II (distinguishing areas where only the states or
Central Government may formulate laws).
55. INDIA CONST. art. 246, List III (providing areas where both the national and state
governments may formulate laws).
56. INDIA CONST. art. 246, List III, cl. 9 (specifying bankruptcy and insolvency as one of
the areas where the central and state government may legislate).
57. See supra Introduction (discussing the application of British common law in India).
58. INDIA CODE CIV. PROC. (1908), §§ 13, 44A (determining the conclusiveness of a
judgment under Section 13 and recognizing the ability of Indian courts to execute judgments
passed in foreign courts of reciprocating territories under Section 44A; the recognition of
judgments of a court in one jurisdiction by a court in another jurisdiction is known as comity).
59. INDIA CODE CIV. PROC. (1908), § 44A.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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CPC.62 According to Section 13, a non-Indian judgment cannot be
enforced if:
(a) the court issuing the judgment does not have competent
jurisdiction;
(b) the judgment was not passed on the merits of the case;
(c) it appears that the proceedings are founded on an incorrect
view of international law or a refusal to recognize the law of India in
cases in which such law is applicable;
(d) the judgment was a result of proceedings opposed to public
order;
(e) the judgment has been obtained by fraud; and
(f) where the judgment sustains a claim founded on a breach of
any law in force in India.63
The Government of India has declared the Commonwealth of
Nations and a few other territories to be reciprocating territories.64 In
cases where the international creditor has obtained a judgment from a
court not located in a reciprocating territory, the creditor must bring a
suit to enforce the decree in an Indian court.65 The CPC provides
methods for the general recognition of judgments but does not refer to
recognizing and enforcing judgments specifically in cross-border
insolvency proceedings.66
2. Winding-Up Procedures under The Companies Act, 1956
The provisions of the Companies Act of 1956 (“Companies
Act”) provide the framework for dealing with insolvency proceedings
where creditors or debtors are located in jurisdictions outside India.67
The Companies Act also prescribes a procedure for winding-up
62. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (together, Section 13 defines the
characteristics of a valid foreign judgment and Section 44A provides for execution only of
those judgments that fit the criteria laid down in Section 13).
63. INDIA CODE CIV. PROC. (1908), § 13.
64. Gupta & Batki, supra note 3, at 98 (identifying courts in the Commonwealth of
Nations and some other States as reciprocating territories in India); see also Sumikin Bussan
Int’l (HK) Ltd. v. King Shing Enterprises and Anr., (2008) 5 Bom. C. R. 464, ¶ 7(B) (defining
Hong Kong to be a reciprocating territory).
65. Gupta & Batki, supra note 3, at 98 (stating that decrees passed by reciprocating
territories may be executed in India); see also Sumikin Bussan Int’l (HK), 5 Bom. C. R. at ¶ 21
(explaining that foreign law is a question of fact that must be proved in execution
proceedings).
66. See supra notes 58–65 and accompanying parenthetical explanations.
67. Companies Act, No. 1 of 1956, INDIA CODE (1956), §§ 484-520.
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insolvent companies incorporated in India.68 Section 584 of the
Companies Act specifically prescribes that an international (nonIndian) company incorporated outside India, but carrying business
in India, may be wound-up as an unregistered company by a
competent high court.69 The winding-up of an international (nonIndian) company is not affected by the winding-up or dissolution of
that company under the laws of the country in which it was
incorporated.70 However, the Act does not provide explicit relief to
international (non-Indian) creditors of Indian companies.71
3. Other Laws Assisting the Present Legal Framework
In 1999, the Government of India appointed the Justice V.B.
Balakrishna Eradi Committee to make recommendations on
streamlining Indian insolvency laws.72 The Committee suggested the
creation of a National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”).73 Some of
the Committee’s recommendations have been adopted, but not all,
with uneven results.74
The Government of India also enacted The Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (“SICA”), to detect sick
companies, meaning companies that have suffered losses greater than
their net worth, and to revive such companies in a timely fashion.75
The primary organ of the SICA is the Board of Industrial and
68. Id.
69. See id. § 584.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Press Release, Government of India, Justice Eradi Committee on Law Relating to
Insolvency of Companies ¶1, http://pib.nic.in/focus/foyr2000/foaug2000/eradi2000.html,
[hereinafter Government of India Press Release, Justice Eradi Committee] (stating that the
Government of India had constituted a committee of experts to examine the existing law
relating to winding-up of companies); see also Sumant Batra, Address at the Second Forum for
Asian Insolvency Reform, Proposals for Reforms – the Indian Position, FAIR 2 (Dec. 16-17,
2004) http://www.sumantbatra.com/pdf/papers/2nd_forum.pdf (commenting that the
government of India set up the Eradi Committee in 1999 to remodel the existing insolvency
framework).
73. Government of India Press Release, Justice Eradi Committee, supra note 72, ¶ 2
(listing the functions the Committee was set up to perform); see also Batra, supra note 72, at
13 (recording that national tribunals in the Companies (Bill) 2001 were formed as a result of
the Eradi Committee’s recommendations).
74. See infra Part III.B.
75. Sick Industrial Companies Act, No. 1 of 1986, INDIA CODE (1985), § 15 (1)
(outlining the functions of the SICA); see also Press Release, The Government of India, Brief
Introduction to the BIFR, “http://bifr.nic.in/introduction.html (stating that the BIFR was
established to rehabilitate sick companies).
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Financial Reconstruction (“BIFR”).76 The Calcutta High Court has
held, however, that SICA does not apply to non-Indian companies,
because “company” under SICA is strictly defined to exclude nonIndian companies.77 However, SICA was sought to be repealed in
2004.78 Further, the Court acknowledged that, although Legislators
sought to repeal the Act in 2004, it continues to have effect as no Act
has been legislated to replace it.79
The NCLT, as contemplated by the Eradi Committee, has
powers ranging from the rehabilitation and revival of companies
under the SICA to the winding-up of companies under the Companies
Act.80 The Indian legislature adopted the Committee’s suggestion to
repeal SICA, but the legislature did not implement the Committee’s
recommendations regarding its replacement.81 Though in theory SICA
stands repealed, due to legislative lags it is still practically in force.82
The major provisions of SICA have been incorporated in the
Companies (Amendment) Act of 2002, but a company may still apply
to the BIFR under SICA to restructure its debts.83
The Committee further recommended that liquidation should be
streamlined and, specifically, that the liquidators should be provided

76. Sick Industrial Companies Act, No. 1 of 1986, INDIA CODE (1985), § 15 (outlining
the process to be followed for relief to sick companies).
77. Yashdeep Trexim v. BIFR 106 S.C.L. 530 (Cal. 2011) ¶¶ 65, 68 (recognizing that the
word “company” has been restrictively defined in the SICA and that it does not include foreign
companies). It is pertinent to note here that High Courts are the highest appellate state courts
and also have original jurisdiction regarding certain matters outlined in their rules.
78. Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, No. 1 of 2004, INDIA
CODE (2003), Preamble; see also Batra, supra note 72, at 2 (affirming the recommendations of
the committee have since been adopted as the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)
Repeal Bill, 2001).
79. Yashdeep Trexim, 106 S.C.L. ¶ 55 (commenting that the repeal has not been
enforced).
80. Government of India Press Release, Justice Eradi Committee, supra note 72, ¶ 7(i)
(defining the jurisdiction and powers of the NCLT); see also Batra, supra note 72, at 13
(recognizing the jurisdiction and powers of the NCLT).
81. See LEXUNIVERSE, Abolition of Sick Industrial Companies Act, (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://www.lexuniverse.com/industrial-policy/india/Abolition-of-Sick-Industrial-CompaniesAct.html (stating that the SICA Repeal Bill lapsed without being passed by the Parliament and
as a result the corresponding provisions introduced in the Companies Act has not yet come
into effect); see also Yashdeep Trexim, 106 S.C.L. 530 ¶ 55 (holding that though SICA was
sought to be repealed, that is yet to be enforced).
82. See LEXUNIVERSE, supra note 81; see also Yashdeep Trexim, 106 S.C.L. ¶ 55
(holding that though SICA was sought to be repealed, that is yet to be enforced).
83. See supra notes 72–82 and accompanying parentheticals (explaining why a company
may apply to BIFR under SICA even though it was sought to be repealed).
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with a greater amount of autonomy.84 In this regard, the Committee
suggested that only two main aspects of liquidation should require
court approval, namely the sale of assets and the distribution of their
proceeds.85 The Committee also recommended that Part VII of the
Companies Act should incorporate substantial portions of the Model
Law.86 In addition to incorporating the Model Law, the Committee
recommended that the Companies Act of 1956 should adopt the
principles laid down by the International Monetary Fund’s Legal
Department on “Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures – Key
Issues.”87 The Government of India took these recommendations into
account and enacted the Companies (Amendment) Act of 2002.88
C. Cross-border Insolvency Cases
The following are cases that have built the body of the common
law regarding cross-border insolvency. The cases discuss the issues of
recognition of international judgments, choice of venue for
commencement of proceedings, vexatious winding-up, treatment of
international creditors vis-à-vis Indian creditors, and restructuring.
The methods employed in the following cases vary, thus causing
confusion and the need for reforms in laws regarding cross-border
insolvency.89

84. Government of India Press Release, Justice Eradi Committee, supra note 72, ¶
7(xiv) (recommending that the liquidator should not seek the sanction of the court except for
important matters such as confirmation of sale of assets and distribution of proceeds realized).
85. Id. (limiting the role of the court to supervision of the sale of a debtor’s assets and
distribution of their proceeds among creditors).
86. Id. (advising the incorporation of the Model Law into the Companies Act); see also
Batra, supra note 72, at 13 (recognizing that the committee sought guidance from the
“UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency”).
87. Government of India Press Release, Justice Eradi Committee, supra note 72, ¶ 7(v)
(recommending the Companies Act incorporate the necessary principles of commencement
and the venue of the insolvency proceedings; who may request commencement; and whether
the nature of the commencement criterion should differ depending on who is requesting
commencement [i.e., the debtor or the creditor] enunciated under the heading “Legal
Framework,” “Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures – Key Issues” on page 9 of the
publication of the Legal Department of International Monetary Fund); see also Batra, supra
note 72, at 13 (acknowledging that the committee sought to incorporate the views expressed by
the International Monetary Fund on key issues relating to “Orderly and Effective Insolvency
Procedures”).
88. See infra Part III.B.
89. See infra Part II.
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1. The Rajah of Vizianagaram v. Official Liquidator
The Companies Act of 1956 does not provide explicit relief to
international (non-Indian) creditors for their claims or causes of
action.90 As early as 1962, however, the Supreme Court of India held
in Rajah of Vizianagaram v. Official Receiver that international
creditors and contributories can bring an action and file a claim under
the Companies Act.91 Through this case, the Supreme Court of India
established the law governing international insolvencies in India.92
In this case, the debtor company was incorporated in England
under the English Companies Act in force at the time.93 The object of
the debtor company was the mining of manganese in Kodur,
Vizagapatnam District in India.94 As the company proved to be
unprofitable, it was unable to pay its debts, including rent due to the
Rajah of Vizianagaram.95 The Rajah subsequently filed winding-up
proceedings that resulted in the appointment of an Official
Liquidator.96 International creditors of the company filed proofs of
debts owed to them by the debtor company but the Rajah objected to
their claims, contending that the liquidation proceedings were
exclusively for the benefit of Indian creditors.97
The question before the Supreme Court was whether
international creditors of a company not incorporated in India and
subject to a winding-up proceeding initiated in India, with respect to
the business of the debtor company in India, could prove their claim
before the Official Liquidator.98 The Supreme Court, after examining
various English precedents, held that under the provisions of the
Companies Act and general principles of comity, international
creditors could prove their claims in the winding-up of unregistered

90. See generally Companies Act, No. 1 of 1956, INDIA CODE (1956), §§ 484-520.
91. Rajah of Vizianagaram v. Official Receiver, AIR. 1962 S.C. 500, ¶¶ 6, 27 (holding
that foreign creditors can prove their claims in winding-up proceedings).
92. See infra Introduction (explaining that since India is a common law jurisdiction,
therefore judgments of the Supreme Court add to the general body of law).
93. Rajah of Vizianagaram, AIR. 1962 S.C. 500, ¶ 2 (stating that the Company was
incorporated in English under the English Companies Act).
94. Id. (affirming that the object of the debtor company was the mining of manganese in
Kodur, Vizagapatnam District).
95. Id. ¶ 3 (declaring that being unprofitable, the company was unable to pay its debts,
including rent due to the Rajah of Vizianagaram).
96. Id. (summarizing the procedural history of the case).
97. Id. (outlining the procedural history of the case).
98. Id. ¶ 4 (formulating the issue in the present case).
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companies in India.99 However, the Court did not answer questions
regarding recognition of international judgments.100 Therefore,
loopholes in the law with respect to cross-border insolvency
proceedings remained.
2. Sumikin Bussan International (HK) Ltd. v. King Shing Enterprises
and Anr.
This case spans three jurisdictions: India, Hong Kong and
Singapore.101 However, this Note focuses on the Indian proceedings,
i.e. Sumikin Bussan International (HK) Ltd. v. King Shing Enterprises
and Anr., which were ongoing as of January 2016.102 The petitioner
was a creditor to Defendant King Shing Enterprises Private Limited
(“King Shing”) regarding a loan made in Hong Kong.103 Defendant T.
K. Mody (“Mody”) was a guarantor for the loan.104 Although Mody is
an Indian national, he is a permanent resident of Singapore, while
King Shing is a company incorporated under the laws of Hong
Kong.105 Both King Shing and Mody were unable to pay the Hong
Kong debt, and the petitioner commenced proceedings in Hong Kong
for recovery of its dues.106 The petitioner was successful in Hong
Kong and received an order (“Hong Kong Order”) entitling him to
relief against Mody’s personal property.107 Unfortunately, Mody’s
property in Hong Kong was insufficient to pay off the debt he

99. Id. ¶ 27 (holding after thorough analysis of English judgments that foreign creditors
can prove their claims in winding-up proceedings).
100. See generally supra notes 91-99 and accompanying parentheticals (explaining the
only issue resolved in this case).
101. See M. T. Mody & Anr. v. Sumikin Bussan International (HK) Limited [2014]
S.G.H.C 123, http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/case-law/free-law/high-co
urt-judgments/15606-manharlal-trikamdas-mody-and-another-v-sumikin-bussan-internationalhk-limited-2014-sghc-123 (providing the background facts to the case).
102. Sumikin Bussan International (HK) Ltd. v. King Shing Enterprises & Anr. (2005) 6
Bom C. R. 240; see Sumikin Bussan Int’l. (HK) Ltd. v. M. T. Mody & Ors., Supreme Court
Case Special Leave Petition (Civil) 26680 OF 2010 connected with Special Leave Petition
(Civil) 3752 OF 2006 status as on Supreme Court Website, www.supremecourt.nic.in (last
visited Jan. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Sumikin Bussan Case Status].
103. M. T. Mody & Anr. v. Sumikin Bussan International (HK) Limited [2014] S.G.H.C
123 ¶ 2 (stating the facts of the case).
104. Id.
105. Id. ¶ 1 (outlining the case facts).
106. Id. ¶ 4 (summarizing the case history).
107. Id. ¶ 4 (highlighting relevant portions of the case history).
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guaranteed.108 Therefore, the petitioner sought execution of the Hong
Kong Order in Mumbai, where Mody owned another property.109
During the pendency of the proceedings to enforce the Hong
Kong Order in Mumbai, Mody filed for bankruptcy in Singapore.110
The order declaring him insolvent was subsequent to an order of the
Bombay High Court attaching his Mumbai property pursuant to the
Hong Kong Order.111 The Official Assignee was the Insolvency
Representative of his estate under the laws of Singapore.112
While deciding the merits of the case, the Bombay High Court
noted that this was a case of comity between States and that municipal
bankruptcy laws had no role to play in such a case.113 The Court
further relied on an English case, Galbraith v. Grimshaw, which
provided that a diligent creditor cannot be divested of an order for
attachment of the debtor’s property.114 In this case, the order for
attachment was delivered before Mody filed for bankruptcy in
Singapore.115 The dispute over whether to grant a stay of the
execution proceedings is still ongoing in a complicated labyrinth as
the case is still bouncing back and forth between the Bombay High
Court to the Supreme Court of India.116
Currently, under Section 44A of the CPC, Hong Kong is a
reciprocating territory but Singapore is not.117 Therefore, the Hong
Kong Order in favor of the petitioner was recognized while the

108. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7 (stating that the sale of Mody’s property in Hong Kong resulted to a
partial satisfaction of the judgment debt leading to the initiation of proceedings in India).
109. Id. (affirming that the sale of Mody’s property in Hong Kong resulted to a partial
satisfaction of the judgment debt leading to the initiation of proceedings in India).
110. Id. ¶ 21 (recognizing the commencement date of the Singapore proceedings).
111. Id. ¶ 8 (formulating the procedural history of the case).
112. Id. ¶ 2 (outlining the procedural history of the case).
113. Id. ¶ 4 (recognizing the role of comity and private international law in the present
case).
114. Id. ¶ 4 (relying on the English precedent in Galbraith v. Grimshaw [1910] AC 508,
recognizing the importance of comity and private international law).
115. Id. ¶ 8 (affirming that the attachment was levied much prior to the order of the High
Court of Singapore adjudicating Mody insolvent).
116. Sumikin Bussan Case Status, supra note 102; see also Chamber Order 1325 of 2010
status as on Bombay High Court Website, www.bombayhighcourt.nic.in (last visited Jan. 2,
2016) (showing the matter is pending before the Bombay High Court).
117. Sumikin Bussan Int’l. (HK) Ltd. v. King Shing Enter. Ltd. & Anr. & ING Bank
NV, (2008) 5 Bom. C. R. 464, ¶ 9 (stating that Hong Kong is a reciprocating territory under
Section 44-A of the CPC).
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Singapore insolvency order was not recognized.118 As shown in the
case here, the English Common Law was insufficient with respect to
helping resolve this case efficiently for the debtor and all the
creditors.119 This case highlights the lack of framework for dealing
with cross-border insolvency cases in India, as the current framework
does not completely provide for a quick and fair adjudication of a
complicated bankruptcy proceeding.120
3. Intesa Sanpaulo S.P.A v. Videocon Industries Limited
The following case involved the insolvency of an Italian
company, VDC, which had a registered office in Italy and was
incorporated under Italian law.121 VDC was a wholly owned
subsidiary of Eagle, a company incorporated in Mauritius, which in
turn was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Indian parent company,
Videocon.122 VDC took a loan from an Italian bank for which
Videocon was a guarantor.123 Under the terms of the Guarantee
Agreement, the guarantor would not only be liable for the debt in case
VDC defaulted on the loan, but it would also become liable for the
debt if VDC’s shares in Eagle changed or if Eagle’s shares in VDC
changed.124
Subsequently, all the eventualities contemplated under the
Guarantee Agreement occurred, which are, inter alia, VDC defaulted
on the loan and Videocon’s shareholdings in Eagle diminished, and
Eagle’s shareholdings in VDC changed, therefore the Italian bank, in
the hope of collecting its debt, filed a petition for winding-up against
Videocon.125 Videocon was a company carrying on a successful
business of consumer durables in India at the time the petition was
filed.126 Nevertheless, the Bombay High Court granted the petition in
favor of the Italian bank.127
118. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying parentheticals (explaining the issues
arising from the conflict of laws and lack of legal framework to efficiently adjudicate this
case).
119. See supra note 114 (discussing the use of English precedents).
120. See infra Part II.
121. Intesa Sanpaulo S.P.A v. Videocon Industries Limited [2014] 183 Comp. Cas. 395
(Bom), ¶ 1 (introducing the parties in the suit).
122. Id. ¶ 4 (providing details of the corporate structure of the respondents).
123. Id. ¶¶ 5-6 (discussing the transaction leading to the suit).
124. Id. ¶ 7 (providing details leading of the transaction leading to the suit).
125. Id. ¶ 19 (stating the details of the default on the transaction).
126. Id. ¶ 20 (discussing the business concerns of the respondent).
127. Id. ¶ 68 (delineating the holding of the Bombay High Court).
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In his rationale, Judge Jamdar stated that any statutory creditor
may bring an action for winding-up.128 The Judge further stated that
this matter involved commercial morality, as it pertains to
international commercial transactions and upholding national prestige
in such transactions.129 He then clarified that depriving the petitioner,
the Italian bank, of its dues would encourage Indian companies to be
dishonest in their international dealings.130 Finally, he added that the
court needed to play an active role in changing the commercial and
economic realities in the face of the globalization of trade and
investments, cross-border flow of capital, and the dependence of the
country’s economy on international commerce.131
The Videocon case showcases a cross-border claim involving a
winding-up petition.132 Furthermore, the case is notable because a
creditor filed a winding-up petition in India even though the
respondent company was not insolvent.133 Therefore, under Indian
jurisprudence, creditors may file winding-up petitions against debtors
even though they may not be insolvent.134
D. Restructuring Cases
Restructuring, also referred to as reorganization, is from the
rehabilitation and revival of companies unable to pay debts.135 The
following section highlights some cases where the courts have
successfully saved insolvent companies from liquidation.136 It also
discusses how judges have adjudicated cases on international levels,
and thus, introduced an international standard of adjudication to
Indian common law.137

128. Id. ¶ 42 (recognizing that the law allows any statutory creditors to bring winding-up
suits).
129. Id. ¶ 65 (viewing the case with commercial morality).
130. Id. ¶ 66. (ruling in favor of the petitioner).
131. Id. ¶ 66. (concluding the order in favor of the petitioner).
132. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying parentheticals (discussing the case
history and its issues and outcome).
133. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying parentheticals (discussing the case
history and its issues and outcome).
134. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying parentheticals (discussing the case
history and its issues and outcome).
135. See supra Part I.B.3.
136. See infra Part I.D.1.
137. See infra Part I.D.2.
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1. Reserve Bank of India v. BCCI
The Indian courts demonstrated a skilled and efficient approach
when handling the cross-border insolvency and liquidation of the
Indian operations of the Bank of Credit & Commerce International
(Overseas) (“BCCI”).138 In this case, the Reserve Bank of India
(“RBI”), the federal bank of India, filed a petition for winding-up
BCCI.139 BCCI was incorporated in the Cayman Islands and thus
considered an unregistered company even though it had a branch in
Mumbai.140 The Governor of the Cayman Islands determined that
BCCI was unable to meet its debt obligations.141 On this basis,
insolvency proceedings were first commenced in the Cayman Islands,
and a Receiver was appointed there.142 RBI initiated a petition in
India on the basis of a faxed version of the order appointing the
Receiver, along with information received from the Provisional
Liquidator appointed for the UK branches of BCCI.143
The Bombay High Court appointed the State Bank of India
(“SBI”) as the Official Liquidator on the petition filed by RBI.144 In
the same order, the Court also provided for a “scheme of
arrangement” under which the SBI would take over the Mumbai
Branch of BCCI.145 The scheme proved to be a blessing in disguise as
the depositors, creditors, and employees of BCCI benefited from it.146
Here, despite the lack of appropriate legislation, the court took the
correct approach by restructuring the Mumbai Branch of BCCI.147
2. In Re: Arvind Mills Ltd.
In this case, the debtor company, Arvind Mills Ltd., was unable
to pay its debts due to a change in market conditions.148 Arvind Mills
138. See infra Part I.D.1.
139. Reserve Bank of India v. Bank of Credit & Commerce International, AIR 1994
BOM. 177, ¶ 1 (stating the cause of action in the suit).
140. Id. ¶ 3 (providing incorporation details of the debtor company).
141. Id. ¶ 4 (reproducing the facts in brief, which led to the filing of the present case).
142. Id. (summarizing the history of the proceedings).
143. Id. (discussing the facts leading to the present suit).
144. Id. (providing the history of the case).
145. Id. (delineating the details of the take-over circumstances).
146. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying parentheticals (explaining the actions of
the Bombay High Court despite appropriate legal framework).
147. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying parentheticals.
148. In Re: Arvind Mills Ltd., [2002] 111 Comp. Cas. 118 (Guj.) ¶ 1 (summarizing the
events leading to the bankruptcy).
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was a public company registered in India and was in the business of
manufacturing and dealing with cotton textiles, among other things.149
The company experienced severe losses between 1997 and 2000 due
to a decrease in the price of denim and increases in manufacturing
costs.150 Further, around March of 2000, thirty-six percent of the total
debt of the company was owed to international lenders.151 Arvind
Mills was not able to generate enough revenue to satisfy its debt
obligations and filed a petition asking the Court to restructure its
debts under the relevant provisions of the Companies Act.152
Under the Companies Act, the members and creditors of the
company must approve a scheme for debt restructuring.153
Accordingly, the court ordered the company to schedule meetings for
all classes of its creditors to seek their approval for the scheme.154 At
the meeting, the company obtained majority votes from working
capital lenders, secured creditors, and unsecured creditors as required
under the Companies Act.155 However, the international creditors,
who were secured creditors, voted against the scheme, as they felt it
was prejudicial to their interests.156
As the minority, the international secured creditors filed their
objections with the Court.157 The main contentions of these creditors
were that the scheme was prejudicial to some creditors because it
sought to “confiscate the legitimate rights and securities of the
objectors” and that, in granting approval of the scheme, the Court
would be “cloaking the fraud” perpetrated by the company.158 The
international secured creditors further claimed that their debt was
different from the debt of the other secured creditors because it was
foreign currency debt.159

149. Id. (providing the debtors’ business details).
150. Id. (pointing out the specific reasons to the bankruptcy of the company).
151. See id. ¶ 1 (stating sixty-four percent of loans were from on-shore lenders, and the
remainder was from foreign creditors).
152. See id. ¶ 9(e) (explaining how the debtor failed to generate revenue to meet its debt
obligations).
153. See id. ¶ 2 (stating the requirements for restructuring under the Companies’ Act).
154. See id. (recognizing that the court acted in accordance with the provisions of the
Companies Act).
155. See id. (summarizing the details of the meeting and types of creditors).
156. See id. ¶ 4 (discussing the election choices of the foreign creditors).
157. See id. (providing the foundation for the present case).
158. Id. (stating the contentions of the foreign creditors before the court).
159. See id. (delineating details of the claims of the foreign creditors).
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In its analysis of the contentions of the international secured
creditors, the Court looked to an English treatise on the Companies
Act for the definition of “class of creditors.”160 First, the Court
concluded that the international creditors could not seek preferential
treatment because the secured creditors all had commonality in
interest.161 The Court further held that the existence of a class within a
class of secured creditors was not possible, as all the secured creditors
have similar rights in the company.162 In conclusion, the court held
that, in the absence of a conflict of commercial interest amongst the
secured creditors, the international secured creditors were not entitled
to be treated as a different class of secured creditors.163 Here, the
Court adjudicated the matter on international standards. 164
E. Restructuring Project Finance Debts
For developing countries such as India, building infrastructure is
as imperative a task as liberalizing the economy.165 Developing
countries are unable to raise the capital required to meet their
infrastructure needs without the assistance and support of foreign
capital such as FDI.166 In India, one such project was the Dabhol
Power Project (“Dabhol”).167 In the early 1990s, in addition to its
economic liberalization, India sought to build power plants financed
by private sector companies to address the country’s power needs.168
160. See id. ¶ 14 (outlining the precedents used by the court).
161. Id. ¶ 15 (recognizing that the commonality of interest amongst all creditors is
repayment of the monies loaned).
162. Id. (formulating the law and viewing all secured creditors equally).
163. See id. ¶ 15 (discussing the outcome of the suit).
164. See THE WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE
INSOLVENCY AND CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS ¶ 12 (April 2001), http://www.worldbank.org/
ifa/ipg_eng.pdf (delineating international standards); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation
in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 708
(explaining that within a class of creditors the fairest basis for distribution is pro rata).
165. See supra Introduction (providing an explanation of the state of the Indian economy
in the 1990s, when the Dabhol project was initiated).
166. See supra Introduction.
167. See Preeti Kundra, Looking Beyond the Dabhol Debacle: Examining its Causes and
Understanding its Lessons, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 907, 908 (2008) (introducing Dhabol
as India’s largest FDI project to date); see also Deeptha Mathavan, From Dabhol to Ratnagiri:
The Electricity Act of 2003 and Reform of India’s Power Sector, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
387, 388-89 (2008-2009) (describing Dabhol as India’s most written-about international
energy project).
168. See Kundra, supra note 167, at 912 (discussing India’s electricity needs in the
1990s); Lamb, supra note 11, at 41 (recognizing the growth in the demand for electricity in
India).
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The Indian Government, aware of its weak negotiating position,
gave this project “fast track” status.169 This move by the Indian
Government attracted international power producers such as Enron,
General Electric (“GE”) and Bechtel Enterprises.170 The three
companies formed a company incorporated under the Companies Act
called the Dabhol Power Company (“DPC”), which was named after
the town in the State of Maharashtra where the power plant was to be
located.171 The main function of DPC was to generate electricity,
which would be bought by the Maharashtra State Electricity Board
(“MSEB”) as per the terms laid out in the Power Purchase Agreement
(“PPA”).172 The PPA contained an international arbitration clause in
case either party defaulted.173
Issues regarding Dabhol first emerged even before construction
of DPC plant was complete, when the government of Maharashtra
changed and a new government came into power; the new
government promised to reduce the costs of electricity.174 This led to
a renegotiation of the PPA, which reduced the cost of electricity by
twenty-two and one half percent per kilowatt hour.175 Construction

169. See Kundra, supra note 167, at 912 (stating that the Indian government gave the
project a “fast-track”); see also Lamb, supra note 11, at 36 (explaining how lending “fasttrack” status allowed the project to go ahead with minimal bureaucracy involved).
170. Kundra, supra note 167, at 908 (commenting on the attractiveness of the Indian
electricity market to foreign investors); see also Mathavan, supra note 167, at 390 (asserting
that the laws encouraged foreign investors to invest in India).
171. See Mathavan, supra note 167, at 393 (discussing the birth of the DPC); see also
Kundra, supra note 167, at 914 (summarizing the creation of the DPC).
172. Mathavan, supra note 167, at 393 (providing the functions of the DPC); see also
Lamb, supra note 11, at 39 (stating that the MSEB did not hold any stake in the project).
173. Kundra, supra note 167, at 908 (affirming that the United States initiated arbitration
under the contract); see also Kenneth Hansen, Robert C. O’Sullivan, &W. Geoffrey Anderson,
The
Dabhol
Power
Project
Settlement:
What
Happened?
and
How?,
INFRASTRUCTUREJOURNAL.COM 5 (2005), http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/
a5aa1e52-4285-4bb5-87e6-7201123895a0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/352f8f09-ae96
-40fc-a293-720d0b8f0ca8/Dabhol_InfrastructureJournal12_2005.pdf (specifying that the
United States initiated arbitration against the Government of India).
174. Mathavan, supra note 167, at 393 (discussing the change of government and the
promises of the new government); see also Lamb, supra note 11, at 39-40 (stating the
appearance of government impropriety as a reason for the failure of the project).
175. Mathavan, supra note 167, at 394 (noting the renegotiation of the PPA); see also
Lamb, supra note 11, at 40 (affirming that an unusually high return on equity guaranteed under
the PPA was a reason for the failure of the project).
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was completed by 1999, and for eighteen months thereafter DPC
produced electricity bought by MSEB.176
However, in October 2000, MSEB failed to make scheduled
payments and despite renegotiation of the PPA, MSEB considered the
price of power too high as the demand for electricity had not grown as
expected.177 In response to the non-payment of its dues, DPC invoked
the arbitration clause set forth in the PPA.178 MSEB initiated
proceedings in the Bombay High Court to declare the PPA void and
the Bombay High Court granted an interim injunction against DPC
and enjoined it from invoking an arbitration case under the
contract.179 DPC appealed to the Supreme Court.180
In the meantime, Enron filed for bankruptcy and sold its stake of
DPC to GE and Bechtel.181 The continuation of legal proceedings
effectively prevented DPC from pursuing relief under the arbitration
clause of the PPA.182 As a result of this blockage, both GE and
Bechtel sought to recover their investment by seeking insurance
payment from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(“OPIC”), a US government corporation that provides political-risk
insurance to companies seeking to invest in emerging markets.183
When OPIC refused to make payments, GE and Bechtel initiated

176. Kundra, supra note 167, at 919 (commenting on the commencement of financial
problems eighteen months after completion); see also Mathavan, supra note 167, at 394
(declaring that Phase I was implemented in 1999).
177. Kundra, supra note 167, at 919 (recognizing that MSEB was unable to meet its
obligations under the PPA and proposed renegotiation); see also Mathavan, supra note 167, at
394 (stating parties agreed to renegotiate the contract).
178. Kundra, supra note 167, at 917 (asserting that DPC commenced international
arbitration in London); see also Mathavan, supra note 167, at 390 (expressing that
international arbitration was commenced when MSEB defaulted on the renegotiated contract).
179. Dabhol Power Co. v. Maharashtra State Elec. Bd. & Ors. AIR 2004 Bom 38 ¶ 1
(providing the procedural history of the suit).
180. Id. ¶ 3 (outlining the contentions of MSEB in the suit).
181. Mathavan, supra note 167, at 395 (recognizing that Enron sold its stake in DPC
pursuant to its bankruptcy); see also Lamb, supra note 11, at 923 (asserting that GE and
Bechtel were the remaining equity owners in DPC).
182. Dabhol Power Co., AIR 2004 Bom 38, ¶ 77 (issuing order in favor of MSEB
dismissing DPC’s claim for arbitration); see also Kundra, supra note 167, at 922 (maintaining
that the Bombay High Court subsequently granted an injunction against DPC pursuing
arbitration).
183. Bechtel Enters. Int’l v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., AAA Case No. 50 T195 00509
02, at 13 (2003), https://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/docs/GOI110804.pdf (recognizing
that Indian courts undermined DPC’s right to fair and impartial administration of justice).
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arbitration proceedings as laid out in the insurance agreements.184 The
arbitral award declared that the Government of India had engaged in
an act of expropriation.185 Some authors have labeled these events the
“Dabhol Debacle,” as they were complicated and resulted in massive
amounts of international chaos.186
The cases referenced in this Part of the Note explain and further
elaborate on how complicated and dysfunctional bankruptcy
proceedings can become with respect to cross-border insolvency and
restructuring issues in India.187 These prolonged and complex
proceedings could possibly deter investors from looking at India as a
promising place to invest.188 Based on the foregoing, the Indian
Legislature should consider enacting a statute that specifically deals
with the rights of international investors in cross-border insolvency
proceedings.189
II. THE RESULT OF LEGAL DISORGANIZATION IN THE REALM
OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS:
HIGHLIGHTING THE MAIN ISSUES
Due to several lags in the Indian legal process, as illustrated in
Part I, issues often arise around cases of international insolvency
proceedings. The following Section highlights some of the issues. The
issues are recognition of judgments, discrimination between Indian
and international creditors, forum shopping, and lack of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
A. Recognition of Judgments
One of the biggest challenges to smooth coordination among
cross-border insolvency proceedings is the recognition of foreign

184. Id. at 14 (establishing that OPIC delayed paying these claims until GE and Bechtel
had obtained a decision from the American Arbitration Association).
185. Id. at 11 (holding that the government of India breached contractual duties to
guarantee MSEB payments, and these actions amounted to expropriation). See generally
Kundra, supra note 167, at 928 (recognizing that judicial actions constituted “total
expropriation” and violations of international law).
186. See generally Kundra, supra note 167, at 907 (titling the note “The Dabhol
Debacle”). See also Mathavan, supra note 167, at 393 (using “Dabhol Debacle” as the heading
of a subsection”).
187. See supra Part I.
188. See infra Part II.B.
189. See infra Part III.A.
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judgments.190 For example, under the Model Law, an order for the
winding-up of a company automatically stays other creditors from
filing legal proceedings against the debtor.191 In cases where
insolvency proceedings are commenced in one jurisdiction and assets
are located in another jurisdiction, sometimes a creditor may apply
directly to the second jurisdiction to attach the international assets in
question.192 Although the administrator of the bankruptcy proceedings
can try to initiate proceedings to set aside the order entitling the
creditor to the property located abroad, this creates problems and is
not always successful.193 The stringent requirements of section 13 of
the CPC impact cross-border insolvency proceedings as foreign
judgments from non-reciprocating territories are rarely enforced,
whereas those from reciprocating territories undergo a strict reexamination process before they are enforced in India.194 For instance,
in Sumikin, the Indian courts did not stay the execution proceedings
when the administrator filed suit.195
In one of the Sumikin proceedings, the Court discussed the
ramifications of the reciprocity provisions of the CPC.196 In Sumikin,
the debtor argued that the attachment of property pursuant to an order
of the Hong Kong Court was invalid, as Hong Kong ceased to be a
reciprocating territory once it was handed over to China.197 The Court
pointed out that in the absence of a notification in the Official
Gazette, Hong Kong was still a reciprocating territory, even though
mainland China is not.198
190. See supra discussion of the case of Sumikin Busan Int’l, Part I.C.2 (highlighting the
chaos caused in the case when the Hong Kong Order was recognized and the Singapore Order
declaring Mody insolvent was not).
191. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 43, art. 19 ¶ 1 (discussing relief to be
provided).
192. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the case of Sumikin Busan Int’l and recognizing
that the petitioner initiated execution proceedings in India and Mody filed for insolvency in
Singapore).
193. See supra Part I.C.2, (discussing the case of Sumikin Busan Int’l and explaining the
inefficiency in the adjudication of the case due to non-recognition of the Singapore insolvency
order).
194. CODE CIV. PROC. (1908) § 13 (laying down the thresholds foreign judgments are
required to meet before they can be recognized or executed in India).
195. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the case of Sumikin Busan Int’l).
196. Sumikin Bussan Int’l. (H.K.) Ltd. v. King Shing Ent. & Ors., (2008) 5 Bom C. R.
464 ¶ 7 (explaining the application of section 44 of the CPC).
197. Id. ¶ 11 (outlining the arguments set forward).
198. Id. ¶ 9 (formulating common law and establishing Hong Kong as a reciprocating
territory).
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With respect to the Singapore proceedings, the Court noted that
there was no treaty between the Government of India and
Singapore.199 Further, the Court determined that the Model Law did
not apply because it is a Model Law, not a treaty.200 Since there was
no legal framework that allowed the Court to recognize a judgment of
a non-reciprocating territory, the Court held that the attachment was
invalid.201 In its reasoning the Court stated that, because the
attachment was levied prior to Mody filing for bankruptcy in
Singapore, the Singaporean bankruptcy proceeding had no effect on
the petitioner’s right of attachment.202 Therefore, Sumikin is evidence
of how the present law with respect to recognition of foreign (nonIndian) judgments in India is a major issue in India’s treatment of
cross-border insolvency cases.
B. Discrimination Between International and Local Creditors
Indian courts generally do not differentiate between domestic
and international creditors.203 International creditors may initiate
insolvency proceedings against a domestic debtor company, may
prove their claims in domestic receivership proceedings, and may
participate in domestic schemes of arrangement.204 In sum,
international creditors are treated on par with domestic creditors in all
cases and are vested with the same rights.205 Likewise, in Arvind
Mills, the Court held that the international secured creditors fell
within the same class as other secured creditors.206 In making this
determination, however, the courts did not consider the exchange rate
risk or investment risk that foreign currency lenders experience.207
Such judgments could harm India’s progress as they would likely
reduce the flow of foreign investment into India because despite equal
199. Id. ¶ 2 (holding that Singapore is not a reciprocating territory as contemplated under
the CPC nor by the operation of international law through a treaty).
200. Id. (recognizing Model Law is not a treaty).
201. Id. ¶ 8 (determining that the attachment was invalid).
202. Id. (stating that the Singapore order cannot affect the right of the attaching creditor).
203. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (allowing foreign creditors to state
their claims in Indian insolvency proceedings).
204. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text (treating foreign currency secured
creditors on par with their Indian counterparts).
206. See supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text (holding common law does not
discriminate between creditors in the same class).
207. See supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text.
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treatment, international investors may perceive themselves exposed to
many unnecessary risks.208
International investors in the Dabhol Debacle similarly found
themselves in a spider web of contradicting political agendas and
unfavorable judicial actions.209 Superficially there was no prejudice
toward the international investors.210 However, a truly non-prejudiced
judiciary would rule prudently in a manner such that they could
recover their investment.211 This matter brought international
attention to the delays in the Indian judiciary and corrupt political
practices.212 The ultimate outcome of Dabhol is the worst case for any
emerging economy because it set precedent to deter future investors,
thereby preventing future investment in infrastructure, which is
desperately needed in India.213
C. Forum Shopping
Forum shopping occurs when a litigant files a case in a court or
jurisdictions where he feels he will be most successful.214 Forum
shopping in the Indian treatment of cross-border insolvency cases
involves filing vexatious winding-up petitions.215 Vexatious windingup petitions are winding-up petitions where the respondent company
is not insolvent; the petitions stem from a bad debt and threaten the
company with liquidation should it not pay off the debt.216 In Intesa,
the court allowed a winding-up petition filed by an Italian bank even
though the respondent company was a well-functioning, solvent
corporate group.217
However, in Marine Geotechnics LLC v. Coastal Marine
Construction & Engineering Ltd., a recent judgment of the Bombay
208. See supra Introduction and accompanying text (stating the need for FDI); supra
notes 149-64 and accompanying text (holding that foreign secured creditors were treated on
par with their Indian counterparts).
209. See supra Part I.E (highlighting the plight of DPC when MSEB prevented it from
initiating arbitration proceedings contemplated under the PPA).
210. See supra Part I.E.
211. See supra Part I.E (delineating the complicated legal process leading to the ultimate
success of the foreign investors).
212. See supra Part I.E (discussing the negative attention the Dabhol project received).
213. See supra Part I.E.
214. Forum Shopping, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
215. See supra notes 121-34 and accompanying text (explaining that a winding-up
petition may be initiated even though the respondent company is not insolvent).
216. See supra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
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High Court, the Court follows a different view from its earlier holding
in Intesa.218 The court previously held that the winding-up petition in
Intesa stemmed from collection on an underlying guarantee, unlike in
Marine Geotechnics.219 In Marine Geotechnics, the winding-up action
was based on a judgment entered by the US District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.220 Moreover, no
execution proceedings of Marine Geotechnics had been filed in
India.221 The Court further stated that winding-up petitions must not
be misused or used as a legitimate method for recovery of a debt;
here—the judgment of the US District Court—whether or not the debt
is bona fide.222 In this case, the Court prevented the abuse of the
judicial process, by not allowing the petitioner to succeed on a
vexatious winding-up petition.223
D. Lack of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Indian insolvency law is more territorial than most.224 It is
subject to a presumption against extraterritoriality, meaning it cannot
be applied beyond the geographic borders of India.225 Moreover,
Indian courts may refuse to recognize the jurisdiction of courts
established in other countries.226 This means that the Indian branch of
an international insolvent company would have to file a new windingup petition in order to prevent the courts from treating it as a separate
matter.227
Although Indian courts have the jurisdiction to wind-up
companies incorporated outside India under section 584 of the
218. Compare Intesa Sanpaulo S.P.A v. Videocon Indus. Ltd. (2014) 183 Comp. Cas.
395 (Bom.), with Marine Geotechnics LLC v. Coastal Marine Constr. & Eng’g Ltd., (2014)
183 Comp. Cas. 438 (Bom.).
219. Marine Geotechnics (2014) 183 Comp. Cas. 438 (Bom.) ¶ 1 (providing the
background history of the case).
220. Id. (outlining the procedural history of the case).
221. Id. (establishing that the cause of action arose from an order of the US District
Court).
222. Id. ¶ 21 (holding that a winding-up petition is not a legitimate means of enforcing
recovery of a debt).
223. See supra notes 215-22 and accompanying parentheticals (comparing two vexatious
winding-up cross-border petitions with uneven results).
224. See supra Part I.B (discussing Indian statutes governing bankruptcy).
225. See supra Part I.B.
226. See supra Part I. B.1 (explaining CPC §§ 44A and 13).
227. Marine Geotechnics (2014) 183 Comp. Cas. 438 (Bom.) ¶ 20 (providing the
method for foreign decree holder to enforce the decree in India).
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Companies Act, and Indian common law provides for equal treatment
of international creditors, there is a discrepancy in the case law on the
grounds for this type of winding-up proceeding.228 Some cases dictate
that a company having outstanding debts with an international
creditor may initiate winding-up proceedings against the company,
even though the company is not insolvent.229 Meanwhile, others
prevent creditors from filing winding-up proceedings when the
respondent company is not insolvent.230 However, the courts are
uniform in holding that in order for an Indian court to exercise
jurisdiction, the debtor company must have carried on business or
must have assets situated in India.231
Alternatively, Indian courts have the discretion to refuse to
exercise their jurisdiction in winding-up a company incorporated
abroad if proceedings are already underway in its place of
incorporation or the proceedings would be more appropriately held in
another jurisdiction.232 The courts in India have previously exercised
their discretion and subjected an international debtor company to a
winding-up procedure in India in Rajah.233 In Rajah, the Court noted
that the Indian proceeding was an ancillary one, as the non-Indian
company was already subject to a liquidation proceeding in its
country of incorporation.234 This fact limited the function and power
of the Indian liquidators.235 The only two functions of the Indian court
were to realize the assets of the company in India, and make a list of
Indian creditors who have lodged claims against the debtor company
in India.236
As India is not a signatory to any international conventions on
insolvency, its laws do not provide for coordination with other

228. See supra Part II.C. (comparing two similar cases with different outcomes).
229. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the case of Intesa).
230. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
231. In Re: Girish Bank, AIR 1959 Cal. 762 ¶ 19 (defining the law of venue or “lexsitus,” with respect to international insolvency proceedings).
232. See supra note 99.
233. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the case of Rajah).
234. See Rajah of Vizianagaram vs. Official Receiver, AIR. 1962 S.C. 500 ¶ 15 (holding
that the proceedings in India were ancillary).
235. Id. ¶ 17 (stating that all foreign creditors should be able to do the same thing Indian
creditors can do and therefore adding more creditors to share the debtor’s limited pool of
assets).
236. Id. ¶ 20 (referring to English precedent).
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insolvency proceedings pending outside India.237 Further, the doctrine
of reciprocity is limited in its application and does not effectuate the
judgments of foreign jurisdictions even under orders of other
courts.238 As was seen in Sumikin, the Bombay High Court recognized
the judgment of the Hong Kong court and did not recognize the
judgment of the Singapore High court.239 Instead, the Indian court
favored the Hong Kong judgment and placed the judgment debtor in
an unfavorable situation, which could have been avoided if there were
a statute addressing cross-border insolvency.240
III. METHODS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF POTENTIAL ISSUES
IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
This Section discusses possible solutions to the problems that
may arise in cases involving cross-border insolvency. First, India
should apply the Model Law discussed in Part I.A.241 Then, efforts
should be made by the Indian legislature to streamline the statutes in
force with provisions specifically dealing with matters of cross-border
insolvency.242 Statutes could also provide a method of monitoring
cash flow in the debtor’s operations with respect to restructuring
proceedings.243 Finally, a regional insolvency pact would facilitate
smoother and quicker processing of cross-border insolvency cases.244
A. Applying the Model Law to Provide Parties to Cross-Border
Insolvencies with Uniform Relief as Recognized by Developed
Nations
If India were to enact legislation applying the principles
underlying UNCITRAL’s Model Law, this legislation would
constitute an important benefit.245 The objectives and principles of the
Model Law have been drafted liberally and provide for discretion in
237. See supra Part II.A (highlighting issues arising due to the lack of legal framework
providing for recognition of non-Indian judgments).
238. See supra Part II.A.
239. See supra Part II.A (delineating the issues caused by the present legal framework).
240. See supra Part II.A.
241. See supra Part I.A (Discussing the main aspects of the Model Law).
242. See infra Part III.A (expressing that streamlining can be achieved with the
application of the model law).
243. See infra Part III.B.
244. See infra Part III.C.
245. See supra Part I.A (explaining the principles, objectives and functionality of the
Model Law).
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almost every aspect.246 Moreover, they provide for coordination and
cooperation between States, which in turn would lead to harmony in
the international legal arena with respect to cross-border insolvency
proceedings.247 If India indeed wants to be considered a key player in
the international business arena it needs to enact legislation that
effectively deals with cases of cross-border insolvency.248
In a case like Sumikin, a law providing cooperation and
coordination between courts of different countries would have led to
an equitable disposal of the debtor’s assets.249 Under such a law, the
Indian courts could have recognized the commencement of
insolvency proceedings in Singapore and granted an automatic stay of
the execution proceedings.250 The stay could have helped to protect
the debtor’s property and litigation expenses, leading to a larger pool
of assets that could be used to satisfy the creditors’ claims.251
In addition to maximizing the creditors’ returns, the legislature
should also enact laws that invite non-Indian creditors to India. In
Arvind Mills, the non-Indian currency lenders complained because
they felt that it was more appropriate that they were placed in a
separate class of creditors due to their varying interests from secured
Indian creditors.252 Though the case was decided on international
standards, the Court failed to notice that such creditors bear greater
risk than that borne by the local creditors due to fluctuations in
exchange rates and government policies that could affect their
loans.253 Therefore, the new law should also contain provisions that
provide further protections to foreign (non-Indian) currency lenders as
this will encourage them to direct more FDI into India.
International (non-Indian) creditors would invest in Indian
companies more confidently as a result of reassurance stemming from
the cross-border insolvency laws.254 To the creditors, these laws
246. See supra Part I.A.
247. See supra Part I.A.
248. See infra Part I.A (listing the need for FDI to enable economic growth).
249. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the case of Sumikin and highlighting chaos caused
due to non-recognition of non-Indian judgments).
250. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the outcome of Sumikin within the framework of
the Model Law explained in Part I.A).
251. See supra Part I.C.2.
252. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the case of Arvind Mills, portraying the chagrin of
the non-Indian currency lenders when they were not compensated for the currency risk).
253. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the case of Arvind Mills).
254. See supra Introduction (stating the need for FDI); see also supra Part I.B
(highlighting discrepancies in the Indian insolvency framework).
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would provide for a “level playing field” and encourage them to
invest in India.255 This in turn would result in an overall boom to
Indian businesses and industries.256
B. Streamlining Indian Law: The Eradi Committee Analyzed
The recommendations of the Eradi Committee resulted in the
enactment of the Companies (Amendment) Act of 2002
(“Amendment Act”).257 Under the Amendment Act, “sickness” is
redefined in a manner that provides for early identification of
distressed companies, which further provides for quicker and more
efficient liquidation or restructuring of the debtor’s assets.258 The
Amendment Act also provides for the establishment of the NCLT.259
Before the effect of the Companies Amendment Act of 2002 had an
opportunity to surface, the legislature enacted the Companies Act of
2013, which contained similar provisions.260 As a result, the Indian
legislature’s over-eagerness to modernize insolvency laws
complicates the assessment of the impact of the new legislation. By
constantly legislating new laws, the legislature adds uncertainty and
unpredictability to the future of cross-border insolvency proceedings
in India.261

255. Steve Kargman, Opportunities and Pitfalls in Emerging Market Restructurings: A
Strategic Perspective, 8.2 THE J. OF PRIV. EQUITY 89, 91 (2005) (stating that creditors may
feel that the local insolvency laws put them at a serious disadvantage); see also Alice Gledhill,
Mismatching Insolvency Laws Spell Trouble for Resolution, REUTERS (July 16, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/16/banks-regulations-idUSL8N0ZQ16120150716
(recognizing that national discrepancies compromise a level playing field).
256. See supra Introduction (stating that liberalization of the economy and the
introduction of FDI led to economic growth).
257. Kang & Nayar, supra note 18, at 47 (affirming that the Amendment Act followed
the recommendations of the Eradi Committee); Companies (Amendment) Act, 2003, No. 11 §
2, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (expressing that the 1956 Act is the principle Act).
258. Companies (Amendment) Act, 2003, No. 11 § 47, Acts of Parliament, 2003
(establishing a mechanism for revival of sick companies).
259. Companies Act, 1956, No. 1 § IB, Acts of Parliament, 1956 (providing for tribunals
and delineating their functions).
260. Companies Act, No. 8 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013), Preamble (stating it is an Act
to consolidate the existing laws regarding companies in India).
261. See id.; Companies (Amendment) Act, 2003, No. 11 §2; Companies (Amendment)
Act, 2003, No. 11 §47; Companies Act, No. 8; Kang & Nayar, supra note 18 (explaining the
difficulty behind assessing the impact of the recent insolvency legislations).
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C. Cash Monitoring the Debtor’s Operations
In the short term, where the changes in the law may not be
evident or effective, it would greatly benefit the creditors to institute a
system of monitoring the business activities of a debtor in
restructuring proceedings.262 According to Steven Kargman, an expert
in the field of restructuring debts in emerging markets, though a
system of cash monitoring would reduce the autonomy of an insolvent
debtor, it would provide for transparency of the liquidation and
restructuring process.263 This may better enable the creditors’ returns
on their investments.264 Further, it would place the creditors in a
position of power, where they could report any asset-shifting or
otherwise fraudulent activity to the authorities in due time.265
D. Regional Insolvency Pact
In any case, India should enter into an agreement in the form of a
treaty with its neighbors with respect to cross-border insolvency and
recognition of judgments.266 A regional treaty of this nature would
provide for smoother cross-border proceedings in Asia and further
extend an invitation to investors.267 It would also lead to an increase
in overall trade and prosperity to the region.268
A regional insolvency treaty would lead to smoother
adjudication of cases like Sumikin.269 In Sumikin, there were
proceedings in Hong Kong, Singapore, and India.270 The Singapore
262. Kargman, supra note 255, at 90 (recognizing that restructurings can remain
unresolved for several years, during which creditors want to ensure their interests are
protected); see also Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate
Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 51, (1982-1983) (establishing the need to monitor the debtor).
263. Kargman, supra note 255, at 91 (noting that the independence of the debtor would
be reduced).
264. See generally id. at 90-91 (providing methods for the creditors to exercise control
over the debtor).
265. Id.
266. UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 12 (noting that regional
treaties may prove to be a useful starting point for broader cooperation); see also supra Part
I.C.2 (highlighting the chaos caused in adjudicating a case without appropriate legal
framework).
267. UNCITRAL MODEL PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 12.
268. Id. at 15 (stating such treaties would improve the situations in the contracting
states); see also supra Part I.C.3 (highlighting the abuse of the winding-up process due to lack
of legal or contractual framework).
269. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing issues arising without the appropriate legal
framework).
270. See supra Part I.C.2 (outlining the procedural history of the case).
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proceedings, not recognized in India, adjudicated the debtor
insolvent.271 This lack of recognition led to a complicated series of
cases and appeals filed with the Bombay High Court as well as with
the Supreme Court of India.272 By adopting a regional treaty, the
parties involved in cross-border insolvency proceedings could better
avoid the hardship faced by the parties in Sumikin.273
CONCLUSION
The optimistic observer sees opportunities for change. The
process of consolidating laws in the realm of cross-border insolvency
is not a simple one. Simplifying steps sometimes backfires and
simplification of insolvency law in India is especially hard due to the
delays within the judiciary and legislature.274 By adopting the
UNCITRAL Model Law, Indian insolvency proceedings would have
international standards.275 Unfortunately, in a country where traditions
are gold and procedure is valued more highly than justice, any type of
change favoring an international (non-Indian) party will be resisted.
To pursue its development goals, the Government of India
should work harmoniously and as an integrated country.276 The state
governments and the Central Government must work hand-in-hand
and consolidate both cross-border and domestic insolvency laws.277
The goal must be unified enacting legislation that provides for a
cross-border insolvency regime while liberalizing FDI regulations.278
Due to the transnational nature of business today, it is common for
Indian companies to have assets located in other jurisdictions.279 It is
possible that these other jurisdictions provide for different degrees of

271. See supra Part I.C.2.
272. See supra Part I.C.2.
273. See supra notes 261-67 and accompanying parentheticals (explaining the
ramifications of a regional insolvency pact and its application to a pending case in India).
274. See supra Part III.B (highlighting the failure of the Indian legislature to frame and
consolidate laws governing cross-border insolvency issues).
275. See supra Part III.A (suggesting that the adoption of Model Law would be an
improvement in cross-border insolvency law in India).
276. See supra Part I.E (highlighting issues in project finance cases due to clashes
between the government of the state of Maharashtra and the central government).
277. See supra Part I.E (highlighting issues in project finance cases due to clashes within
the Indian state and central government).
278. See supra Part III.B.
279. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the ramifications of Indian companies with assets
in debt abroad).
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recognition.280 In order to compete with these jurisdictions and
provide for a speedy and expeditious gathering, liquidation, or
restructuring of such assets India must modernize its insolvency
regime. Such definite steps would drive India toward development.

280. Status UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 52
(providing a list of countries that have adopted the Model Law including the United States and
United Kingdom).

